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incentives as rewards versus equivalent penalties increases testing by lowering the subjective
testing criterion and by increasing the assessed risk of material misstatement. However, testing
increases primarily when a misstatement is absent, causing more false alarms under a reward
frame with no improvement in misstatement detection. Penalties are pervasive in auditing. Our
study suggests that rewards are more effective for increasing testing, and that increasing testing
blindly can impair audit efficiency.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Incentives are anything that motivates behavior. Neo-classical economic theory predicts
that framing equivalent incentives as rewards versus penalties should not change agents’
behavior. However, a stream of research finds that imposing penalties versus economically
equivalent rewards increases agents’ effort and effort-based productivity (e.g., Hannan,
Hoffman, and Moser 2005; Church, Libby, and Zhang 2008; Brink 2011; Hossain and List
2012). This stream of research, however, has not examined diagnostic performance that is also a
part of many accountants’ work, such as identifying the cause of labor efficiency variances
(Brown 1987), the cause of missing earnings targets, the cause of differences between tax and
book income, and the cause of cash flow shortage. Effort is not the only determinant of
diagnostic performance. Therefore, we know little about whether and how incentive framing
affects diagnostic performance.
Examining this question is particularly important and relevant to auditing. First, auditing
is diagnostic in nature. Auditors must obtain reasonable assurance about whether a material
misstatement is the cause of a phenomenon among the possible causes (AS 1001.02; AS
1101.03). Second, the design of auditor incentives affects the supply of audit quality (Watts and
Zimmerman 1981; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Although penalties are less preferred by agents and
less commonly used than rewards in designing incentives (Luft 1994; Brink and Rankin 2013),
auditors face penalties in various forms and from various sources, such as criticism from internal
and external inspectors, reduced performance ratings from supervisors, scrutiny from the media,
lawsuits from investors, fines from regulators, and license suspension from professional
oversight bodies (Knechel, Salterio, Ballou 2007; Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman 2013). Third,
prior research examines the provision (providing versus not providing rewards) rather than the

1

2

Framing in Diagnostic Tasks

framing (providing rewards versus economically equivalent penalties) of auditor incentives
(Barr-Pulliam, Brazel, McCallen, and Walker 2020; Brazel, Leiby, and Schaefer 2021). We take
the first step to examine the framing of auditor incentives regardless of their forms or sources.
Diagnostic performance is challenging because different causes can lead to the same
phenomenon. Of interest to auditors is whether a material misstatement is the underlying cause.
For example, if auditors observe an increase in retail sales but a decrease in the number of retail
stores, a possible cause is that sales are overstated, and another possible cause is that the client is
shifting to online retailing. Testing increases the chance of identifying the cause. However,
testing consumes the audit budget and delays completion. Auditors have a limited budget and
generally fewer than 60 days to complete an annual audit (SEC 2002). Therefore, it may not be
possible to test every phenomenon. Auditing standards prescribe risk-based testing (AS 1101.10,
11). More testing is needed if the risk of material misstatement is high than when it is low. We
examine risk judgment (i.e., the assessed risk of material misstatement) and testing action (i.e.,
test or not) in diagnostic performance.
In a binary diagnostic task where a misstatement is either present or absent, and where
auditors decide to either test or not test, there are four possible outcomes (see Table 1): a false
alarm (misstatement absent/test), a hit (misstatement present/test), a correct rejection
(misstatement absent/not test), and a miss (misstatement present/not test). Drawing on prior
research (e.g., Blocher, Moffie, and Zmud 1986; Brown 1981; Sprinkle and Tubbs 1998; Ramsay
and Tubbs 2005; Macmillan and Creelman 2004), we assume that auditors decide to test or not
by comparing their risk judgment to a subjective testing criterion (i.e., threshold) that could vary
across auditors. Auditors are more likely to test if the assessed risk of misstatement exceeds the
subjective threshold and less likely to test if otherwise.
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Objectivity and accuracy are desired qualities of diagnostic performance. Auditing
standards generally prescribe objective judgments and actions. For example, AS 1015.08
requires “objective evaluation of evidence”, and AS 1015.09 states that “the auditor neither
assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty” when evaluating and
requesting evidence. Additionally, auditing standards prescribe risk-based testing rather than
more testing regardless of the risk of material misstatement. The former values the accuracy of
judgments and actions, whereas the latter does not. Under the risk-based testing approach, it is
critical that auditors make accurate risk judgments such that testing is likely to result in hits
rather than false alarms, and that not testing is likely to result in correct rejections rather than
misses.
When auditors are incentivized to be objective and accurate, we predict that framing the
incentives as rewards versus equivalent penalties changes performance objectivity by lowering
the subjective testing criterion. Given the same risk judgment, the lower the testing criterion, the
more likely auditors will test. Therefore, we predict that a reward frame increases testing. The
subjective testing criterion is determined, in part, by how auditors weigh the four outcomes in
binary diagnostic tasks. If auditors weigh ensuring hits and ensuring correct rejections equally
(i.e., weigh avoiding misses and avoiding false alarms equally), then auditors should choose an
objective criterion and be unbiased between testing and not testing (also see Nelson’s 2009
discussion on the “neutral” view of professional skepticism). Supervisor preference, testing cost,
and the design of incentives can affect how auditors weigh the outcomes.
Crowe and Higgins (1997) find that a reward versus penalty frame increases the weights
on ensuring hits and avoiding misses in memory recognition. Unlike remembering the previous
occurrence of a phenomenon as in memory-recognition tasks, diagnosing the cause of a
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phenomenon among the possible causes requires reasoning. Nonetheless, if a reward frame also
increases the focus on ensuring hits and avoiding misses in diagnostic tasks, a reward frame
should lower the subjective testing criterion and increase testing. Given the same testing
criterion, the higher the assessed risk, the more likely auditors will test. We further explore
whether framing also affects the assessed risk to better understand whether the predicted increase
in testing results from a change in the subjective criterion, the risk judgment, or both. Crowe and
Higgins (1997) do not examine the underlying beliefs of memory performance and thus do not
allow us to predict whether framing affects risk judgment.
We further predict that framing equivalent incentives as penalties versus rewards
increases the accuracy of risk judgments and testing actions when auditors are incentivized to be
objective and accurate. Prior research finds that penalties versus rewards of the same magnitude
increase on-task attention (Yechiam and Hochman 2013, 2014), and that increased attention
improves the accuracy of signal detection (Broadbent and Gregory 1963). Accurately diagnosing
the cause of a phenomenon requires reasoning, which consumes attentional resources. Therefore,
increased on-task attention induced by a penalty frame should improve diagnostic accuracy. If
we interpret on-task attention as effort (Kahneman 1973), our reasoning is consistent with prior
findings that imposing a penalty frame increases agents’ effort and effort-based productivity
(e.g., Brink 2011; Church et al. 2008; Hannan et al. 2005). In our case, cognitive effort increases
diagnostic accuracy.
We test our predictions in a between-participants experiment, holding participants’
incentives equivalent between the reward and penalty frames. Participants are provided with 100
bags and asked to identify whether each bag is mislabeled (i.e., the cause) based on its
appearance (i.e., the phenomenon). An incorrect label represents a material misstatement. Key to
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diagnostic decision-making, a mislabeled and correctly labeled bag can look the same. Attending
to relevant information and engaging in effortful reasoning should help participants infer whether
a bag is mislabeled. Participants are asked to assess the likelihood of mislabeling for each bag
and decide whether they will test the bag. Testing reveals whether a misstatement exists, but
testing is costly. Participants are incentivized to test objectively and accurately under both
frames, consistent with what auditing standards prescribe. By using real distributions to generate
the bags, we establish normative benchmarks to evaluate performance objectivity and accuracy.
We find that incentive framing changes performance objectivity rather than accuracy. As
predicted, a reward frame lowers the subjective testing criterion and increases testing.
Interestingly, participants are unaware of the corresponding change in how they weigh the hits
(versus correct rejections) and misses (versus false alarms), which suggests that framing affects
the subjective testing criterion automatically and unconsciously. Although unpredicted, the
assessed risk of mislabeling is marginally higher under a reward than a penalty frame.
Controlling for the assessed risk reduces but does not eliminate the effect of framing on testing.
Therefore, a reward frame increases testing by increasing the assessed risk and by lowering the
testing criterion. Also unpredicted, participants facing the reward frame increase testing mostly
when a bag is correctly labeled rather than mislabeled, causing more false alarms under a reward
versus penalty frame with no improvement in misstatement detection. Therefore, increasing
testing blindly can reduce audit efficiency.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we examine the effect of incentive framing
on diagnostic performance. Prior incentive framing research focuses on effort-based productivity
such as translating symbols (e.g., Church et al. 2008) and completing sliders (e.g., Imas, Sadoff,
and Samek 2017), but effort is not the only determinant of diagnostic performance. As reported
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later, our proxies for effort (i.e., on-task attention), increase diagnostic accuracy but do not
predict testing. In fact, we observe that framing affects performance objectivity with no effect on
our proxies for effort. By examining the key audit constructs of risk judgments and testing
actions, we provide new insight into how framing affects performance objectivity beyond
memory recognition. We find that a reward frame increases testing by lowering the subjective
testing criterion and by increasing the assessed risk. Although we focus on the audit setting, our
findings should apply to other accounting settings of diagnostic performance.
Second, by examining the objectivity and accuracy of diagnostic performance, we
provide a more precise understanding of how auditor incentives can be designed to motivate the
desired behavior. If heightened risk judgments and more testing are desired (i.e., professional
skepticism under “presumptive doubt” about management assertions, see Nelson 2009), then
framing auditor incentives as rewards is more effective than penalties. Encouragingly, regulators
recently started to acknowledge the good practices of accounting firms in inspection reports,
which used to disclose audit deficiencies only (PCAOB 2019, 2020). Conversely, if accurate risk
judgments and testing actions are desired, framing auditor incentives as rewards is not more
effective than penalties. In fact, increasing testing blindly can reduce audit efficiency.
Accounting firms who are concerned with audit costs may consider framing auditor incentives as
rewards on high-risk audits where increased testing is necessary.
Finally, we contribute to the research methodology by designing a task that is effective
and efficient for examining diagnostic performance. Our task captures the nature of diagnostic
decision-making by allowing different causes for the same phenomenon and by requiring
effortful reasoning for identifying the cause. Our task utilizes real distributions to establish
normative performance benchmarks for evaluating objectivity and accuracy, which are important
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qualities of judgments and actions. Our task features parameters (e.g., incentives) that can be
easily changed for future research. To understand whether and how incentive framing affects
diagnostic performance, we incentivize participants to be objective and accurate, following what
auditing standards prescribe, but this need not be the case for future research. Our task employs
an abstract setting that does not require specialized knowledge but general knowledge that
novice participants possess. We hope our task will be helpful to the broader field of experimental
accounting.
II.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Objectivity and Accuracy in Diagnostic Performance
Objectivity and accuracy are desired qualities of diagnostic performance. Auditing
standards generally prescribe objective evaluation of evidence, requiring auditors to neither
assume that a misstatement exists nor assume that a misstatement does not exist in evaluating
and gathering evidence (AS 1015.08, 09). Additionally, auditing standards prescribe a risk-based
testing approach. More testing is needed if the risk of material misstatement is high, and less
testing is needed if the risk of material misstatement is low (AS 1101.10, 11). This approach
balances audit effectiveness with audit efficiency, recognizing that testing is costly to meeting
tight budgets and deadlines. Under this approach, it is critical that auditors make accurate risk
judgments such that testing targets higher risk areas where a material misstatement is more likely
to exist.
Distinguishing objectivity from accuracy is important for evaluating auditor performance
(Ramsay and Tubbs 2005). For example, if the risk of material misstatement is high, and if an
auditor increases testing, it is unclear whether the increased testing is based on a biased
assumption or an accurate inference that a misstatement is likely to exist. If this auditor also
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increases testing when the risk of material misstatement is low, then it is clear that this auditor
cannot accurately distinguish whether a misstatement exists, and that testing is based on a biased
assumption that a misstatement is likely to exist regardless of the changes in the phenomenon.
On the other hand, if this auditor decreases testing when the risk of material misstatement is low,
then it is clear that this auditor can accurately distinguish the presence or absence of a
misstatement, and that testing is based on an objective evaluation of the phenomenon.
Objectivity
Drawing on prior research (e.g., Blocher et al. 1986; Macmillan and Creelman 2004), we
assume that an auditor decides to test a phenomenon by comparing the assessed risk with a
subjective testing criterion. An auditor is more likely to test if the assessed risk exceeds the
criterion. Given the same risk judgment, the higher the criterion, the less likely the auditor will
test. Although auditing standards generally prescribe objective judgments and actions, several
factors can cause auditors to choose a testing criterion that deviates from a neutral standpoint
(Sprinkle and Tubbs 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs 2005). Among these factors are the frequency of a
material misstatement that an auditor encounters in prior experience and the relative weight that
an auditor places on the four outcomes (false alarms, hits, correct rejections, and misses) in
binary diagnostic tasks.
For example, if an auditor has only worked on audits of restated financial statements, this
prior experience can cause the auditor to presume a higher than warranted base rate of
misstatements, lower the testing threshold, and be biased towards testing in future audits, ceteris
paribus. Additionally, if an auditor’s supervisor punishes the auditor for incurring false alarms,
as commonly observed in practice and research (Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer and Stewart 2016;
Brazel, Gimbar, Maksymov, and Schaefer 2019), the anticipation of supervisor punishment can
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cause the auditor to weigh avoiding false alarms more than avoiding misses. As a result, the
auditor will increase the testing threshold and be biased towards not testing in future audits,
ceteris paribus.
We predict that a reward, as opposed to a penalty, frame causes auditors to lower their
subjective testing criterion and increase testing (see Appendix 2 for arguments based on expected
utility). Research on memory recognition finds that, when participants were asked to indicate
whether a picture or a word currently presented was provided in a previous list, a reward versus
penalty frame causes participants to ensure hits and avoid misses (Crowe and Higgins 1997;
Levine, Higgins, and Choi 2000; Bowen, Marchesi, and Kensinger 2020). Obviously, in
diagnostic tasks auditors are not asked to indicate whether they remember the previous
occurrence of a phenomenon but are asked to infer whether a material misstatement is the cause
of the phenomenon among the possible causes. Although diagnostic performance requires
reasoning whereas memory performance does not, if a reward frame also causes auditors to be
more concerned with ensuring hits and avoiding misses, auditors should lower their subjective
testing criterion and be more inclined to test under a reward frame.
H1: A reward frame increases testing relative to a penalty frame.
H2: A reward frame lowers the subjective testing criterion relative to a penalty frame.
We explore whether auditors’ risk judgments also contribute to the predicted increase in
testing under a reward versus penalty frame. Recall that auditors are assumed to test a
phenomenon if their assessed risk exceeds their subjective testing criterion, and not to test if
otherwise. Therefore, increased testing (H1) could result from a decrease in the subjective testing
criterion (H2), an increase in the assessed risk (i.e., the risk judgment underlying the testing
action), or both. Prior research on memory recognition does not examine participants’ underlying
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beliefs (Crowe and Higgins 1997; Levine et al. 2000; Bowen et al. 2020), and therefore cannot
speak to whether framing affects the assessed risk. Therefore, we pose a research question.
RQ: Does the incentive frame affect the assessed risk of material misstatement?
Accuracy
Recall that auditing standards require risk-based testing rather than more testing
regardless of risk, and that accurate risk judgments are critical in risk-based testing. Auditor
expertise increases the accuracy of risk judgments by facilitating the effective selection and
representation of informational cues from a phenomenon (Bonner 1990; Hammersley 2006). The
quality of information available for risk judgments and the amount of attention that auditors
invest in risk judgments can also affect the accuracy of risk judgments and the risk-based testing.
When auditors are incentivized to be accurate, we predict that framing the same incentives as
penalties versus rewards increases the accuracy of risk judgments and testing actions by
increasing the cognitive effort (i.e., attention) that auditors invest in diagnostic tasks.
Accounting research finds that imposing penalties as opposed to economically equivalent
rewards motivates participants to increase productivity by increasing effort (e.g., Hannan et al.
2005; Church et al. 2008; Brink 2011; Hossain and List, 2012). A common explanation is that
the disutility of losing one dollar is greater than the utility of gaining one dollar (i.e., loss
aversion, see Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Therefore, participants facing penalties versus
rewards (i.e., potential losses versus gains) are more motivated to increase effort or productivity
when doing so helps them avoid losses. When increased accuracy helps auditors avoid losses, a
penalty frame should motivate more cognitive effort and improve diagnostic accuracy.
Additionally, attention research shows that imposing penalties versus rewards of the same
magnitude (e.g., losing one dollar versus gaining one dollar) improves feedback-based learning

10

11

Framing in Diagnostic Tasks

when participants’ attention is depleted (Yechiam and Hochman 2014), suggesting that penalties
increase on-task attention relative to rewards (Yechiam and Hochman 2013). Attention has the
same meaning as effort (Kahneman 1973). In this sense, attention research and accounting
research are consistent on the implications of incentive framing. Heightened attention increases
the accuracy of detecting sounds (Broadbent and Gregory 1963). If a penalty frame increases ontask attention, heightened attention should also increase the accuracy of detecting material
misstatements.
H3: A penalty frame increases the accuracy of risk judgments and testing actions relative
to a reward frame.
Note that H3 does not imply that the answer to our research question is yes. In other
words, increased judgment accuracy under a penalty frame (H3) does not allow us to predict that
incentive framing affects the level of the assessed risk (RQ). For example, if the actual risk (i.e.,
likelihood) of material misstatement is 50 percent, assessing a 45 percent likelihood is more
accurate than assessing a 40 or 60 percent likelihood. However, the level of a more accurate risk
judgment (45 percent) can be either below (60 percent) or above (40 percent) the level of a less
accurate risk judgment. Therefore, increased judgment accuracy does not predict the level of the
assessed risk. Also, note that H1 does not imply H3. That is, testing more does not imply that
testing is less accurate. Additionally, H2 does not imply H3, meaning that auditors can increase
or decrease their subjective testing criterion independent of their judgment accuracy or testing
accuracy.

11

12

Framing in Diagnostic Tasks

III.

METHOD

Participants
We recruit 196 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk for our incentivized
experiment.1,2 We argue that using MTurk participants is efficient and effective for testing our
theory: imposing rewards decreases the subjective testing criterion and diagnostic accuracy
relative to imposing economically equivalent penalties. To evaluate the testing criterion and
diagnostic accuracy precisely, we must establish normative benchmarks for what the “correct”
risk judgments and testing actions are. We do so by designing an abstract task with real
distributions underlying the risk of material misstatement. Our task does not require specialized
auditor knowledge but general knowledge that MTurk participants possess. Thus, using auditor
participants for our task would be unnecessary. Using auditor participants when unnecessary
may reduce other researchers’ access to these valuable participants (Libby, Bloomfield, and
Nelson 2002) and create a tragedy of the commons (Garrett 1968).
We argue that our findings are likely applicable to auditors for three reasons. First, prior
research suggests that novice participants are reasonable proxies of professionals when tasks do
not require specialized knowledge (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk 2007; Bolton, Ockenfels,
and Thonemann 2012). Indeed, Hong (2022) replicates the effects observed among auditors on
complex judgment with novice participants in a judgment task that requires only general
knowledge. Second, as we discuss later, framing affects testing (H1) and the subjective testing
criterion (H2) automatically and unconsciously. Like other experimental participants, auditors

1

To reduce the risk of collecting low quality data, we restricted participants to those, as per MTurk, who had high
accuracy (i.e., greater than 95 percent approval rate), high productivity (i.e., had completed more than 1,000 other
tasks), and were in the U.S. or Canada, heeding advice from others using worker platforms (e.g., Peer, Vosgerau,
and Acquisti 2014; Mturkdata 2018). Additionally, we restricted participants to high school graduates and above.
2
We obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board of a west coast university where the experiment took
place.
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are susceptible to automatic, unconscious effects, which are difficult to eliminate even with
targeted interventions (Brazel et al. 2019).3 Third, compared to novice participants, auditors are
likely to allocate more cognitive effort to tasks that are relevant to their work (i.e., initially more
engaged, see Hong 2022). Higher effort increases diagnostic accuracy, as we argue in developing
H3. If auditors are more accurate than novice participants, incentive framing is unlikely to have
an incremental effect on accuracy for auditors. We find that framing does not affect accuracy
even with novice participants. Therefore, inferences about H3 are unlikely to change with auditor
participants.
Bag Inspection Task
Participants performed a diagnostic task in which they assessed the risk of misstatement
and decided whether they will test any potential misstatement, following the procedures in
Figure 1. Specifically, participants assumed an auditor's role for a hypothetical company that
makes heating and cooling bags for physical therapy. Due to a mistake in production, all bags
were labeled as cooling bags. The company would not change a bag label unless testing revealed
that the bag was a heating bag. A mistake in the label represents a material misstatement in the
financial statements, which will remain uncorrected unless testing reveals that the misstatement
exists. Recall that under the risk-based testing approach, more testing is needed if the risk that a
material misstatement exists is high, and less testing is needed if the risk is low. Therefore, as we

3

Specifically, Hong (2022) observes the same automatic, unconscious effects of priming a promotion versus
prevention focus (i.e., regulatory focus) among auditors and among novice participants (see footnote 3 in Hong
2022). Imposing a reward versus penalty frame is a way of priming a promotion versus prevention focus (Crowe and
Higgins 1997), which is the theoretical basis for H1 and H2. A promotion focus represents the motivational
orientation for pursuing hopes and aspirations, whereas a prevention focus represents the motivational orientation
for pursuing duties and obligations (Higgins 1998). A reward frame causes decision-makers to view the incentivized
goal as hopes and aspirations, whereas a penalty frame causes decision-makers to view the same goal as duties and
obligations (Shah, Higgins, and Friedman 1998). The evidence from Hong (2022) suggests that the results of H1 and
H2 should generalize to auditors.
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describe later, participants were incentivized to test a bag if the label is misstated and not test a
bag if the label is correctly stated.
Key to diagnostic decision-making, different causes can lead to the same phenomenon.
By looking at the phenomenon, auditors do not know for sure whether a material misstatement is
the underlying cause. Similarly in our task, a mislabeled bag and a correctly labeled bag can have
the same appearance. However, attending to relevant information and engaging in effortful
reasoning should help participants infer whether mislabeling is the underlying cause based on a
bag’s appearance. Specifically, participants were told that (i) each thermal ball in a heating bag
has a 60 percent chance of being red and a 40 percent chance of being white, (ii) each thermal
ball in a cooling bag has a 60 percent chance of being white and a 40 percent chance of being
red, and (iii) the company produced thousands of bags with the same number of heating and
cooling bags. Attending to this information and engaging in effortful reasoning should help
participants infer that a bag is likely mislabeled and requires testing if the number of red balls in
a bag exceeds the number of white balls in that bag (see examples of bags in Table 2). As we
explain later, the bags come in two sizes.
Participants reviewed 100 bags drawn from two equally likely distributions (heating and
cooling). Unknown to participants, 49 bags were heating, and 51 bags were cooling. All
participants saw the same 100 bags in random order. For each bag, participants (i) assessed the
likelihood that the bag was mislabeled, and (ii) decided whether they would test the bag. Testing
would reveal the bag type and allow the company to relabel the bag if necessary. Not testing
means the bag retains the “cooling” label. Participants were told that their decision to test a bag
would not affect whether the next bag presented was mislabeled. Thus, participants should base
their risk judgments and testing actions on the appearance of each bag rather than the number of
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bags already tested. We checked participants’ comprehension of these key aspects of the task.
Participants could not proceed to reviewing the bags until they answered all seven
comprehension checks correctly. We did not reveal the “correct” risk judgment or the bag type
immediately after participants reviewed each bag. Instead, we provided feedback after all bags
were inspected. Future research can examine whether providing interim feedback affects
diagnostic performance.
Independent Variable
Following the spirit of the auditing standards (AS 1101.10, 11; AS 1015.09), we
incentivize participants to test accurately based on the risk of material misstatement and
objectively with no bias between testing and not testing. We manipulate the incentive frame
(reward versus penalty) between participants, keeping their payoffs constant for a given level of
accuracy between frames. In the reward frame condition, participants were informed that they
would make two dollars plus a two-dollar bonus if 2/3 or more of their testing decisions turned
out to be correct. Correct decisions refer to testing a mislabeled bag (i.e., a hit) or not testing a
correctly labeled bag (i.e., a correct rejection). In the penalty frame condition, participants were
informed that they would make four dollars minus a two-dollar penalty if more than 1/3 of their
testing decisions turned out to be incorrect. Incorrect decisions refer to testing a correctly labeled
bag (i.e., a false alarm) or not testing a mislabeled bag (i.e., a miss). To promote unbiased
testing, in both conditions, participants’ payoffs are designed to be the same for incurring hits or
correct rejections, and the same for incurring false alarms or misses.
Consistent with real-world audits, testing is costly. We embed the testing cost in
participants’ payoffs. In both conditions, testing correctly labeled bags is designed to reduce
participants’ payoffs. However, incurring the testing cost is worthwhile when bags are
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mislabeled, consistent with real-world situations where the benefit of detecting a material
misstatement that exists outweighs the testing cost incurred to detect that misstatement. Thus,
testing mislabeled bags is designed to increase participants’ payoffs. In our task, the company
also desires accurate and unbiased testing, consistent with participants’ incentives (see details at
Appendix 1 for the entire instrument). Participants learned their performance and payoffs at the
end of the study (mean = 3.22 dollars). The payoffs do not differ between conditions (t194 = 1.40,
p = 0.163).4
Dependent Variables
Participants provided their risk judgments and decided their testing actions on the same
screen for each bag (one bag per screen). The heating and cooling distributions from which we
drew the bags provide normative benchmarks for analyzing judgments and actions. The
dependent variables related to risk judgments are judgment bias and judgment inaccuracy. The
dependent variables related to testing actions are the percentage of bags tested, the location of the
testing criterion, and testing accuracy. We describe each variable below.
Risk judgments
Risk judgments are the assessed likelihood of mislabeling averaged across 100 bags. To
evaluate risk judgments, we use the posterior likelihood of mislabeling as a normative
benchmark. Accordingly, judgment bias is the assessed likelihood of mislabeling for a bag minus
the posterior likelihood for that bag averaged across 100 bags. Judgment inaccuracy is the
absolute deviation of the assessed likelihood for a bag from the posterior likelihood for that bag
averaged across 100 bags.5 The posterior likelihood is a function of the number of red balls

4

All p-values are two-tailed except when otherwise noted for directional predictions.
Our measures of bias and inaccuracy are consistent with proxies used in earnings forecasts research (e.g., Walther
and Willis 2013; Duru and Reeb 2002), where forecast bias is the signed forecast error (i.e., forecasted earnings –
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minus the number of white balls in a bag (i.e., #Red - #White), given the properties and prior
probabilities of the heating and cooling distributions (see Table 2). For example, if #Red #White is zero, the posterior likelihood of mislabeling is 50 percent regardless of the bag size
(six or twelve balls per bag). The higher the value of #Red - #White, the higher the posterior
likelihood of mislabeling. Note that in Table 2 different bag compositions can produce the same
#Red - #White. For example, a six-ball bag with two red balls has the same posterior likelihood
of mislabeling as a twelve-ball bag with five red balls. By varying the bag size, we can verify if
participants strictly use #Red-#White in assessing risks.
Testing Actions
We calculate the percentage of bags tested based on participants’ testing action for each
bag. To evaluate participants’ testing criterion and testing accuracy, we adopt measures from
signal detection theory (Macmillan and Creelman 2004; Ramsay and Tubbs 2005). Specifically,
we calculate the hit rate and false alarm rate of each participant. The hit rate is the percentage of
mislabeled bags that are tested, and the false alarm rate is the percentage of correctly labeled
bags that are tested. Recall that drawing the bags from the two equally likely distributions
(heating and cooling) resulted in 49 mislabeled bags, and 51 correctly labeled bags. Therefore,
the actual bag types, along with participants’ testing action for each bag, allow us to calculate the
hit rate and false alarm rate of each participant.
The location of the subjective testing criterion is an additive function of a participant’s
hit rate (H) and false alarm rate (F): −0.5 ['()) + '(,)].6 A zero value suggests that a
actual earnings), and forecast inaccuracy is the absolute value of the forecast error. In our task, the actual risk of
material misstatement is the posterior likelihood that a bag is mislabeled.
6
Z(rate) is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution, where rates are greater than zero but less than
one. Z(rate) values are negative for rates less than ½, zero for a rate of ½, and positive for rates greater than ½. The
specific forms denoted assume that the perceived distributions are normally distributed with equal variance, and that
there are sufficient observations of each state of nature so that the rates are meaningful (Macmillan and Creelman
2004; Ramsay and Tubbs 2005).
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participant is unbiased between testing and not testing, and that the participant chooses a neutral
criterion for testing. In our task, the neutral criterion is located at which the number of red balls
equals the number of white balls in a bag (i.e., #Red - #White = 0). Recall that the prior
probability of mislabeling is 50 percent (i.e., the heating and cooling distributions are equally
likely), and that participants’ payoffs are the same for incurring hits or correct rejections and the
same for incurring misses or false alarms.7 Therefore, our task is designed to promote the choice
of a neutral criterion. Choosing the neutral criterion means that participants will test a bag if the
observed #Red - #White is greater than zero (i.e., exceeds the neutral criterion) and that
participants will not test a bag if the observed #Red - #White is less than zero (i.e., falls short of
the neutral criterion).
The criterion location takes a negative value when a participant lowers the subjective
testing threshold from the neutral criterion. In this case, the cutoff point for testing is located at
which #Red - #White is negative, suggesting an action bias towards testing. Testing all bags
regardless of the risk of mislabeling suggests an extremely low testing threshold. In this case, the
hit rate and false alarm rate are both 100 percent. Accordingly, the criterion location takes the
value of negative infinity, suggesting an extremely low testing threshold. On the other hand, the
criterion location takes a positive value when a participant increases the subjective testing
threshold from the neutral criterion. In this case, the cutoff point for testing is located at which

7

These parameters serve as a starting point for understanding whether and how incentive framing affects diagnostic
performance. We recognize that the parameters in practice may differ from our design in idiosyncratic ways. For
example, working on restatement audits may cause auditors to perceive the prior probability of a misstatement to be
greater than 50%; working with supervisors who punish costly skepticism may create stronger incentives to ensure
correct rejections (versus hits) and avoid false alarms (versus misses); auditing clients who face stricter regulatory
oversight (e.g., brokers-dealers and banks) may create stronger incentives to ensure hits (versus correct rejections)
and avoid misses (versus false alarms). In addition to promoting objective testing, another benefit of our parameters
is that they are simple, which allow novice participants with general knowledge to accurately infer whether a bag is
mislabeled based on its appearance with reasonable effort. Future research can alter the parameters to suit the
research question of interest.
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#Red - #White is positive, suggesting an action bias towards not testing. Not testing any bags
regardless of the risk of mislabeling suggests an extremely high testing threshold. In this case,
the hit rate and false alarm rate are both zero percent. Accordingly, the criterion location takes
the value of positive infinity, suggesting an extremely high testing threshold.
Testing accuracy is a function of the difference between the hit rate and false alarm rate:
'()) – '(,). A higher value indicates higher accuracy in differentiating the mislabeled bags
from the correctly labeled bags. If a participant tests all mislabeled bags and does not test any
correctly labeled bags, the hit rate will be 100 percent, and the false alarm rate will be zero
percent. In this case, testing accuracy is positive infinity, indicating perfect accuracy. If a
participant tests all bags regardless of the risk of mislabeling, both the hit and false alarm rate
will be 100 percent. In this case, testing accuracy is zero, suggesting failure to differentiate the
mislabeled bags from the correctly labeled bags. Similarly, if a participant does not test any bags,
regardless of the risk of mislabeling, both the hit and false alarm rate will be zero percent. In this
case, testing accuracy is again zero, suggesting failure to differentiate. We also use the
percentage of testing decisions that turn out to be correct as an additional proxy for testing
accuracy. Recall that correct decisions refer to testing a mislabeled bag or not testing a correctly
labeled bag.
IV.

RESULTS

Participants’ Understanding of the Auditor Role
Risk Judgments
To assess whether participants understood their auditor role, we evaluate whether
participants’ risk judgments and testing actions correspond to the risk of material misstatement.
Recall that the greater the number of red balls relative to white balls in a bag (#Red - #White),
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the higher the posterior likelihood of mislabeling (see Table 2). We compare participants’
assessed likelihood of mislabeling for low-risk bags (#Red - #White ≤ -4, posterior likelihood
of mislabeling ≤ 16.49%) versus high-risk bags (#Red - #White ≥ 4, posterior likelihood of
mislabeling ≥ 83.50%). Out of the 196 participants, only five participants assessed a higher
likelihood of mislabeling for low- versus high-risk bags. Overall, participants appeared able to
understand the relationship between bag compositions and the likelihood of mislabeling.
Testing Actions
Recall that participants were incentivized to test accurately and objectively. Attending to
the relevant information and engaging in effortful reasoning should help participants arrive at a
perfect testing strategy that maximizes their payoffs. Under both frames, the perfect testing
strategy is to test a bag when the posterior likelihood of mislabeling is greater than 50% (#Red >
#White), to not test a bag when the posterior likelihood is lower than 50% (#Red < #White), and
to be indifferent in testing when the posterior likelihood is equal to 50% (#Red = #White). Out of
the 196 participants, 45 participants adopted the perfect testing strategy for all bags (rewards: n =
23; penalties: n = 22).
Relaxing the benchmark of a perfect testing strategy, we examine whether testing weakly
increases as the risk of misstatement increases. Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the eight risk
categories per bag composition (i.e., #Red - #White). For each participant, we consider testing to
be weakly increasing if the percentage of bags tested within a higher risk category (e.g., #Red #White = 4) is equal to or greater than that within the adjacent lower risk category (e.g., #Red #White = 2). Among the 196 participants, 165 participants tested an equal or higher percentage
of bags as the risk of misstatement increases from one category to the next across all eight

20

21

Framing in Diagnostic Tasks

categories (rewards: n = 82; penalties: n = 83). Therefore, most participants increased testing as
the risk of misstatement increased.
Unqualified Participants
The results above suggest that, overall, participants understood their role as auditors.
However, we exclude observations from 20 participants whose risk judgments and testing
actions are internally inconsistent. Specifically, these participants tended to test a bag when their
assessed likelihood of mislabeling for that bag was 48 percent or lower, and they did not test a
bag when their assessed likelihood of mislabeling for that bag was 52 percent or higher.8 Thus,
we retain 176 observations in the tests of hypotheses.
Tests of Hypotheses
Test of H1
H1 predicts that a reward versus penalty frame increases testing. Recall that we kept
participants’ payoffs economically equivalent between frames. If participants’ testing actions
only depend on payoffs, then framing should not affect testing. However, as predicted,
participants in the reward frame condition test a higher percentage of bags than those in the
penalty frame condition (means = 54.7% versus 50.1%, one-tailed p = 0.019, Table 3).9 Figure 2

8

We label these participants as “flippers” (ten in each condition). To be classified as a flipper, a participant must test
when the assessed likelihood of misstatement is low and not test when the assessed likelihood of misstatement is
high. So, a participant who always (or never) tested would not be categorized as a flipper. Flippers provided
internally inconsistent judgments and actions more than 50 percent of the time (on average, for 58 bags out of 100
bags). For comparison, out of the 196 participants, 54 participants never provided inconsistent judgments and
actions, and 122 participants did so for no more than five out of the 100 bags. Compared to non-flippers, flippers
made significantly fewer correct testing decisions, failed more task comprehension checks in their first attempt, and
scored lower on the expanded cognitive reflection test (Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2014) that is indicative of
analytical ability (Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2011; Welsh, Burns, and Delfabbro 2013; all p-values ≤ 0.002).
These results suggest that flippers are potentially confused about and incapable of performing our task. Including all
observations does not change any inferences except that it would slightly weaken the results reported for testing
actions. Specifically, the p-values reported in Table 3 would be 0.051 for the percentage of bags tested, 0.054 for the
criterion location, and 0.102 for the false alarm rate.
9
Incentive frame does not interact with bag size in predicting any of the dependent variables (all p-values > 0.160,
untabulated). Therefore, we pool data across bag sizes in tests of hypotheses.
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shows that testing increases under a reward versus penalty frame for all eight risk categories (i.e.,
bag compositions in Table 2). To explore which risk categories drive the main result of increased
testing, we estimate a panel regression in equation (3). Participants identify the panels and bags
identify the trials. The dependent variable is Choice, measured at the bag level. For each bag,
Choice equals 1 if that bag was tested and 0 if not. Treatment is the incentive frame (rewards = 1;
penalties = 0). Composition is an indicator variable denoting the eight risk categories.
/0 = 2! + 2" 345678597 + : 2#$ ;<8=<>?7?<9 + : 2%$ 345678597 @ ;<8=<>?7?<9

(3)

A reward frame significantly increases the likelihood of testing than a penalty frame in
three risk categories. We denote the three categories with an asterisk in Figure 2 (2" + 2%$ > 0
for the (B) categories at a 5% level, untabulated). Two of the categories have a lower risk of
misstatement, with the posterior likelihood of mislabeling being 8.07 percent for #Red - #White
= -6 and 30.77% for #Red - #White = -2. The third category (#Red - #White = 4) has a higher
risk of misstatement, with the posterior likelihood of mislabeling being 83.50 percent.10
Test of H2
H2 predicts that a reward versus penalty frame lowers the subjective testing criterion.
Recall that a zero value in the criterion location indicates a neutral standpoint, meaning that
participants are unbiased between testing and not testing. A negative value indicates a testing
criterion that is lower than the neutral standpoint, suggesting an action bias towards testing. A
positive value indicates an increased testing criterion from the neutral standpoint, suggesting a
bias towards not testing. We find that the value of the criterion location is lower in the reward
10

One might suspect that for participants who understood the task perfectly, the difference in testing might be
greatest when it is most uncertain whether a misstatement exists. Restricting the analysis to the 45 participants who
adopted the perfect testing strategy, we find that when the posterior likelihood of mislabeling is 50 percent (#Red #White = 0), participants in the reward frame condition tested 73 percent of the time, whereas participants in the
penalty frame condition tested 60 percent of the time. While the direction is consistent with H1, the difference is not
significant at conventional levels.
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versus penalty frame condition (one-tailed p = 0.024, Table 3). Therefore, H2 is supported.11,12
More specifically, the criterion location under a reward frame is on average -0.16 and
significantly different from zero (t85 = 2.64, p = 0.010), suggesting a testing bias. In contrast, the
criterion location under a penalty frame is on average -0.012 and not significantly different from
zero (t89 = 0.47, p = 0.766), suggesting unbiased testing.
Recall that the criterion location is a function of the transformed hit rate and false alarm
rate. We further explore how the incentive frame affects the hit rate and false alarm rate. The hit
rate is the percentage of mislabeled bags that are tested, and the false alarm rate is the percentage
of correctly labeled bags that are tested. In our study, the hit rate does not differ by incentive
frames (p = 0.162, Table 3). However, the false alarm rate in the reward frame condition is
significantly higher than that in the penalty frame condition (means = 39.4% versus 33.8%, p =
0.032, Table 3), due to increased testing in the two lower-risk categories (#Red - #White = -6 and
-2, Figure 2). Therefore, increasing testing blindly can increase audit cost with no improvement
in misstatement detection.13
Interestingly, our results suggest that framing affects the subjective testing criterion
automatically and unconsciously. In developing H2, we argue that a reward frame increases the
weights on ensuring hits and avoiding misses compared to a penalty frame. Participants’
responses to post-task questions suggest that they are unaware of the changes in how they weigh
hits (versus correct rejections) and misses (versus false alarms) in response to the difference in

11

Inferences do not change if we use the untransformed hit rates plus the untransformed false alarm rates (H + F) as
an alternative measure for the testing criterion location (t174 = 2.09, one-tailed p = 0.019, untabulated).
12
Trait-level regulatory focus (Higgins et al. 2001) does not differ by conditions (t174 = 0.93, p = 0.352). Inferences
about H1 and H2 do not change if we control for trait-level regulatory focus. Specifically, trait-level regulatory
focus does not by itself or interact with the incentive frame in predicting testing or the criterion location (all pvalues > 0.478). This result suggests that the observed framing effects should apply to those who self-select into
accounting because of their trait-level regulatory focus.
13
Inferences do not change if we use the number of hits and the number of false alarms each participant incurred as
alternative measures, instead of the hit rate and false alarm rate per participant.
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framing, even though their subjective testing criterion changes in response to the difference in
framing. Specifically, participants rated their agreement with four statements on seven-point
Likert scales in the post-experimental questionnaire: 1) “I was concerned about mistakenly
testing a bag that is correctly labeled”, 2) “I was concerned about mistakenly NOT testing a bag
that is mislabeled”, 3) “I wanted to make sure that all bags that are mislabeled get tested”, and 4)
“I wanted to make sure that all bags that are correctly labeled do NOT get tested”. We calculate
the relative weights on hits versus correct rejections by subtracting the rating for statement (4)
from that for statement (3). Similarly, we calculate the relative weights on misses versus false
alarms by subtracting the rating for statement (1) from that for statement (2). Neither of the selfreported relative weights differ by frames (p-values > 0.421).
Tests of H3
H3 predicts that a penalty frame increases the accuracy of risk judgments and testing
actions relative to a reward frame. We fail to find evidence consistent with H3. Specifically,
judgment inaccuracy, measured as the absolute error in the assessed likelihood of mislabeling
averaged across 100 bags, does not differ by incentive frames (one-tailed p = 0.191, Table 3).
Testing accuracy, measured as '()) – '(,), also does not differ by incentive frames (one-tailed
p = 0.287, Table 3).14 Inferences do not change when we use the number of correct testing
decisions made as an alternative measure for testing accuracy (one-tailed p = 0.233, Table 3).
Recall that in developing H3, we argue that increased on-task attention (i.e., cognitive
effort) increases the accuracy of risk judgments and testing actions. In our task, attending to case
information and investing effort in the task suggest increased on-task attention. Therefore, we
use participant’s performance on the seven comprehension checks and their self-reported effort

14

Inferences do not change if we use the difference of the untransformed hit and false alarm rates (H – F) as an
alternative measure for testing accuracy (t174 = 0.66, one-tailed p = 0.253, untabulated).
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invested in the task (0: not at all; 10: very much) as proxies for the unobservable on-task
attention. Consistent with our reasoning, both proxies are significantly positively correlated with
judgment accuracy and testing accuracy (all p-values < 0.002). However, neither proxy differs by
incentive frames (p-values > 0.794). Additionally, neither proxy is significantly correlated with
the percentage of bags tested or the testing criterion location (all p-values > 0.282), suggesting
that the decision to test or not depends on more than attention and effort.
To summarize, we find that a reward versus penalty frame increases testing by lowering
the subjective testing criterion. However, framing fails to induce a difference in effort (i.e., ontask attention), which is observed to increase diagnostic accuracy. Prior research finds that
imposing penalties versus economically equivalent rewards increases effort (e.g., Hannan et al.
2005), which further increases productivity (e.g., Hossain and List 2012; Imas et al. 2017). We
do not observe such an effect potentially because the cognitive effort required in diagnostic
decision-making, such as attending to relevant information and engaging in logical reasoning, is
less responsive to incentive framing compared to the effort examined in prior research, such as
choosing effort levels (e.g., Hannan et al. 2005; Brink 2011; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012;
Gonzalez, Hoffman, and Moser 2020), completing sliders (e.g., Imas et al. 2017), translating
symbols (e.g., Church et al. 2008), and producing electronic parts (e.g., Hossain and List 2012;
Van der Stede, Wu, and Wu 2020).
Examining Alternative Explanations
In this section, we consider alternative explanations for our results. We find that
participants in the penalty frame condition are marginally higher in the need for cognition (t174 =
1.92, p = 0.056) and they are more loss averse (t174 = 2.83, p = 0.005) than those in the reward
frame condition. The need for cognition represents individuals’ disposition to engage in and
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enjoy effortful thinking (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). We measure the need for cognition using the
scale developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Feng Kao (1984). Loss aversion represents the extent to
which the decrease in utility from losing one dollar exceeds the increase in utility from gaining
one dollar (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We measure loss aversion using participants’ choices
in six hypothetical gambles adapted from prior research (Kahneman 1992; Tversky and
Kahneman 1991; Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, and Mersmann 2007). We next examine
whether the differences in participants’ need for cognition and loss aversion drive the effects of
incentive framing.
We find that the differences in need for cognition do not explain our test results for H1
and H2. Specifically, the need for cognition score is not significantly correlated with the
percentage of bags tested or the criterion location (Spearman, both p-values > 0.635,
untabulated). The need for cognition score is also not significantly correlated with the hit rate
(Spearman, p = 0.187, untabulated). However, a higher need for cognition is marginally
associated with a lower false alarm rate (Spearman, r = -0.138, p = 0.068), raising the concern
that the false alarm rate is higher under a reward than penalty frame because participants in the
reward frame condition are lower in need for cognition. Including need for cognition as a
covariate does not eliminate the effect of the incentive frame; the false alarm rate remains
marginally higher under the reward versus the penalty frame (t173 = 1.87, p = 0.064).
We also find that the differences in need for cognition do not drive our test results for H3.
Higher diagnostic accuracy requires attention and effortful thinking. Consistent with our proxies
for on-task attention (i.e., performance on comprehension checks and self-reported task effort), a
higher need for cognition is associated with higher testing accuracy, a higher number of correct
testing decisions made, and higher judgment accuracy (all p-values < 0.013, untabulated). Recall

26

27

Framing in Diagnostic Tasks

that participants in the penalty frame condition score marginally higher on need for cognition
compared to those in the reward frame condition. Therefore, testing accuracy, the number of
correct decisions made, and judgment accuracy should be higher under a penalty frame than a
reward frame, implicitly supporting H3. Yet we still do not observe support for H3. Therefore,
H3 remains unsupported.
Finally, the differences in loss aversion cannot explain any of our results for two reasons.
First, loss aversion does not correlate with any of our dependent variables reported in Table 3 (all
p-values > 0.218). Second, prior research frequently cites loss aversion as the reason why
imposing penalties versus economically equivalent rewards increases effort and effort-based
productivity (Hannan et al. 2005; Brink 2011; Hossain and List 2012; Imas et al. 2017),
assuming that agents have the same level of loss aversion between frames. In our study, the level
of loss aversion is higher under the penalty versus reward frame. If the cognitive effort required
in our diagnostic task is akin to the effort examined in the aforementioned research, then the
difference in loss aversion should motivate more cognitive effort in the penalty frame condition
in addition to the difference in framing, biasing in favor of finding support for H3. Yet, we fail to
find support that participants’ performance accuracy (H3), self-reported motivation to maximize
payoffs (0: not at all; 10: very much), and on-task attention (proxied as above) are higher under
the penalty versus reward frame (all one-tailed p-values > 0.190).
Test of Research Question
Auditors are assumed to test a phenomenon if their assessed risk exceeds the subjective
testing criterion. A reward versus penalty frame can increase testing (H1) by lowering the
subjective testing criterion (H2), increasing the assessed risks (RQ), or both. We take two steps
to better understand the mechanism through which framing affects testing. First, we examine
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whether the incentive frame affects the assessed risk of material misstatement (RQ). Second, we
examine the effect of framing on testing while controlling for the assessed risk. Any remaining
effect of framing should be attributed to changes in the testing criterion. Although the test of H2
suggests a lowered testing criterion under a reward versus penalty frame, the criterion location
measure assumes that the assessed risk is accurate under both frames, which may not be true in
our experiment.
Regarding our RQ, the assessed likelihood is marginally higher under a reward versus
penalty frame (means = 53.4% versus 51.7%, p = 0.064, Table 3), suggesting that a reward frame
induces a judgment bias towards assuming that a material misstatement exists (p = 0.064, Table
3). More specifically, the assessed likelihood of mislabeling significantly exceeds the posterior
likelihood of mislabeling in the reward frame condition (i.e., judgment bias > 0, p = 0.012,
untabulated), and the assessed likelihood does not significantly differ from the posterior
likelihood in the penalty frame condition (i.e., judgment bias = 0, p = 0.607, untabulated).
To explore which risk category drives the overall effect of framing on risk judgments, we
estimate equation (3) using a panel regression. Participants identify the panels and bags identify
the trials. The dependent variable is log $ &)1 − &* where C represents the assessed likelihood of
mislabeling. We transform the assessed likelihood to remove its lower (0%) and upper bounds
(100%). When y = 0% (y = 100%), we replace its value with 0.1% (99.9%) so that the
transformed value is bounded away from negative (positive) infinity. We find that the
transformed assessed likelihood is significantly higher under a reward frame than under a penalty
frame in two risk categories. We denote the two categories (#Red - #White = -2 and 0) with an
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asterisk in Panel A of Figure 3 (2" + 2%$ > 0, for the (k) categories at a 1% level, untabulated).15
Also in these two categories, we find that participants’ judgment bias (i.e., assessed – posterior
likelihood) is more positive under a reward versus penalty frame using equation (3) (see Panel B
of Figure 3).
Next, we test the effect of incentive frame on testing actions controlling for participants’
risk judgments. We estimate equation (4) using logit regression and the same panel that we used
in equation (3). The dependent variable is Choice (1 = test; 0 = not test) at the bag level. The
independent variables are treatment (1 = rewards; 0 = penalties) and belief (participants’ assessed
risk categories). Specifically, belief has seven categories based on participants’ assessed
likelihood of mislabeling: 0 – 9%, 10-24%, 25-48%, 49-51%, 52-75%, 76-90%, and 91-100%.
;ℎ<?E5 = 2! + 2" 345678597 + : 2#$ F5G?5H + : 2%$ 345678597 @ F5G?5H

(4)

Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of bags tested within each subjective risk category
(belief), constructed based on participants’ assessed likelihood of mislabeling. After conditioning
choice to test by assessed likelihood, the effect of the incentive frame remains significant in two
subjective risk categories (p < 0.05, untabulated). We denote these subjective categories (52-75%
and 76-90%) with an asterisk. Therefore, controlling for conscious risk judgments does not
eliminate the effect of incentive frame on testing actions, suggesting that increased risk
judgments and reduced testing criteria jointly contribute to increased testing under a reward
frame.
Potential Heuristics in Risk Judgments

15

This result is robust to using panel Tobit regression and fitting the same equation with the assessed likelihood as
the dependent variable.
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As illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3, participants overestimate the likelihood of
mislabeling when the risk of misstatement is low (posterior likelihood < 50%), and they
underestimate the likelihood of mislabeling when the risk of misstatement is high (posterior
likelihood > 50%; all p-values < 0.01). This pattern appears to be the result of participants using
heuristics in risk judgments. Specifically, participants appear to use the percentage of red balls in
a bag (i.e., fraction red, see Table 2) to estimate the likelihood of mislabeling (Figure 4, Panel
B). Regressing the assessed likelihood against predictor fraction red shows a better fit than
predictor posterior likelihood, as evidenced in lower Akaike’s information criterion and
Bayesian information criterion (untabulated).16 Using fraction red to estimate the likelihood of
mislabeling should reduce any differences in risk judgments between incentive frames. Yet, we
still observe a marginal difference in judgments by frames in the test of RQ.
Interestingly, Panel B of Figure 4 suggests that, as bag size increases, using fraction red
to estimate the likelihood of mislabeling appears to amplify the judgment bias pattern observed
in Panel B of Figure 3. In other words, as bag size increases from six balls to twelve balls per
bag, participants overestimate the risk of misstatement to a greater exent when the risk is low
(i.e., #Red - #White < 0), and they underestimate the risk of misstatement to a greater extent
when the risk is high (i.e., #Red - #White > 0). Table 2 explains why: the posterior likelihood of
mislabeling is a function of #Red - #White regardless of bag size, whereas fraction red is a
function of bag size rather than #Red - #White. When the bag size is small (i.e., six balls per
bag), fraction red approximates the posterior likelihood of mislabeling in value. However, when
the bag size is large (i.e., twelve balls per bag), fraction red further deviates from the posterior

16

Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion are two ways of scoring competing models based on their loglikelihood and complexity. In other words, each criterion deals with both the risk of overfitting and the risk of
underfitting, albeit with different weights.
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likelihood, exceeding the posterior when the risk is low (#Red - #White < 0) and falling short of
the posterior when the risk is high (#Red - #White > 0).
V.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Diagnostic performance is integral to many accountants’ jobs, such as identifying the
cause of budget overruns, the cause of declining sales, the cause of changes in working capital,
and the cause of employee turnover among the possible causes. We examine diagnostic
performance in the audit setting. Auditors must provide reasonable assurance about whether a
material misstatement is the underlying cause of an observed phenomenon. Given a
phenomenon, auditors must assess the risk of misstatement and decide whether they will perform
additional testing to help identify the cause. Auditing standards value accuracy and objectivity in
auditors’ judgments and actions. When auditors are provided with incentives to test accurately
and objectively, we examine whether and how framing equivalent incentives as rewards versus
penalties affects auditors’ risk judgments and testing actions. Economic theory predicts that
framing should not affect performance. However, in an experiment, we find that a reward versus
penalty frame increases testing by lowering participants’ subjective testing criterion and by
increasing their assessed risk. Framing affects the testing criterion automatically and
unconsciously. Controlling for the assessed risk does not eliminate the effect of framing on
testing.
In our experiment, increased testing under a reward versus penalty frame did not improve
the identification of misstatement but resulted in more false alarms when financial statements
were fairly presented. For accounting firms that might be concerned with controlling audit costs,
our result highlights the importance of improving the accuracy of auditors’ risk judgments and
testing actions. On the other hand, increased testing, even if it causes more false alarms with no
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improvement in misstatement detection, can be beneficial in several ways. First, at the early
stage of auditor tenure, increased testing regardless of the misstatement risk can help deter
clients from manipulating financial statements in the future. Second, in repeated audits, clients
learn auditors’ testing approach overtime. Increased testing in low-risk areas helps prevent
clients from hiding misstatement in low-risk areas that auditors normally would not test. Third,
increased testing helps auditors gather more evidence and thus develop more precise beliefs
about their clients, even when increased testing results in false alarms.
Our study provides a baseline understanding of whether and how the incentive frame
affects diagnostic performance. Participants were incentivized to test accurately without bias, as
desired by the auditing standards. In practice, an auditor may have already developed a strong
bias towards (or away from) testing, for example, from interacting with a supervisor who
consistently rewards (or punishes) testing that results in false alarms (Brazel et al. 2016, 2021). It
is then unclear whether a reward versus penalty frame can further increase testing. Our results
suggest that conscious risk judgment does not solely rationalize increased testing, and that
framing affects the subjective testing criterion automatically and unconsciously. Auditors are
susceptible to automatic, unconscious effects, which even targeted interventions fail to eliminate
(e.g., Brazel et al. 2019). Therefore, our results should generalize to situations where auditors
have already developed a bias towards or away from testing. Consistent with our reasoning, the
effect of framing on testing did not disappear when participants assessed a greater than 50
percent likelihood of misstatement, for which the obvious action is to test (Figure 4 Panel A).
Future research can test the generalizability of our findings.
Finally, auditors are responsible for providing “reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement” (AS1001). Regulators, investors, and the
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media have generally held auditors accountable for financial statement outcomes (misstated or
not), particularly when client bankruptcies or restatements occur after auditors issue an
unqualified opinion, even though the opinion can be justified by auditors’ judgment processes
(Peecher et al. 2013). In our experiment, participants are evaluated and paid based on financial
statement outcomes rather than their judgment processes. However, applying the “correct”
judgment process (i.e., adopting the perfect testing strategy), also increases the likelihood of
being accurate about the outcomes (i.e., testing accuracy). We acknowledge that auditors who
apply the “correct” judgment process can still issue an “incorrect” opinion, while at the same
time auditors who apply the “incorrect” judgment process can also issue a “correct” opinion,
about financial statement outcomes. Given this discrepancy, future research can examine
whether designing auditor incentives based on financial statement outcomes versus judgment
processes is more effective for improving audit quality.
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Appendix 1: Research Instrument
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Jl-6Dwh3fiCr99iiS8SB8jwWTu0t7Qk_/view?usp=sharing

Appendix 2: Expected Utility Representation of H1 and H2
In binary diagnostic tasks, an auditor’s decision to test a phenomenon or not results in
four possible outcomes shown in Table 1. Each outcome results in different utility for the
auditor. We denote the utility functions for the four outcomes as I" for a false alarm, I# for a
hit, I% for a correct rejection, and I& for a miss. We assume that the worst favorable outcome
results in greater utility than the best unfavorable outcome (i.e., 8?9{I# , I% } > 86M{I& , I" }),
that testing increases the certainty as to whether a misstatement is present, and that testing
consumes resources. Therefore, if a misstatement is present, the auditor prefers to test, and if a
misstatement is absent, the auditor prefers to avoid costly testing. Our assumptions are consistent
with the auditing standards that require a risk-based testing approach, which values diagnostic
accuracy. We do not define any specific form of the auditor’s utility functions or any risk
preferences.
A testing strategy considers the posterior likelihood of misstatement after observing the
phenomenon @ and the outcome utilities when deciding whether to test or not. If the auditor
decides to test, then the outcome will be a false alarm or hit, and if the auditor decides not to test,
the outcome will be a correct rejection or miss. If the auditor tests, then the expected utility is:
Pr(%|'())
Pr(%|./)
!!
52 + (1 − !! )
5
!! Pr(%|'()) + (1 − !! ) Pr(%|./)
!! Pr(%|'()) + (1 − !! ) Pr(%|./) 3
0111111111112111111111113
01111111111111211111111111113
"#$%&'(#' *(+&*(,##- #. /($$%0%&/&1%

(1)

"#$%&'(#' *(+&*(,##- #. 1# /($%0%&/&1%

N' is the prior probability of misstatement. N4(@|>7675) is the probability of observing the
phenomenon @, given the state that a misstatement is present (Yes) or absent (No). If the auditor
does not test, then the expected utility is:
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Pr(%|'())
Pr(%|./)
!!
54 + (1 − !! )
5
!! Pr(%|'()) + (1 − !! ) Pr(%|./)
!! Pr(%|'()) + (1 − !! ) Pr(%|./) 5
0111111111112111111111113
01111111111111211111111111113
"#$%&'(#' *(+&*(,##- #. /($$%0%&/&1%

(2)

"#$%&'(#' *(+&*(,##- #. 1# /($%0%&/&1%

A criterion @$ is the point where the auditor is indifferent between testing or not. To find
the criterion, we set equation (1) equal to equation (2), which characterizes the criterion value in
terms of prior probabilities and outcome utilities:
N' N4(@$ | P5>) (I# – I& ) = (1 − N' ) N4(@$ | R<) (I% – I" )
⟹

N4(@$ | P5>) (1 − N' ) (I% – I" )
=
N4(@$ | R<)
N'
(I# – I& )

(3)

Solving equation (3) yields the criterion @$ (i.e., threshold). To satisfy the equation, the higher
the right-hand side value of equation (3), the higher a @$ is needed. For example, ceteris paribus,
the criterion increases when the prior probability of misstatement (N' ) decreases (i.e., the righthand side value increases). That is, the fewer misstatements that an auditor observes in past
audits, the more likely the auditor will increase the subjective testing criterion and be biased
towards not testing. As another example, ceteris paribus, the criterion decreases when the utility
of a hit (I# ) increases (i.e., the right-hand side value decreases). That is, the more an auditor
cares about ensuring hits, the more likely the auditor will lower the subjective testing criterion
and be biased towards testing.
A testing strategy depends on the relationship of the subjective testing criterion @$ to the
posterior likelihood of misstatement =. For any observed phenomenon, the updated posterior
likelihood of misstatement is evaluated against the criterion:
= ⋛ @$

(4)

The auditor tests when the left-hand side of equation (4) is greater than the right-hand side, does
not test when the left-hand side is less than the right-hand side, and is indifferent when the two
sides are equal. The right-hand side @$ serves as the testing threshold. When I# = I% , I" = I& ,
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and N' = (1 − N' ), then the criterion is 50%. In this case, auditors should test a phenomenon if
the assessed likelihood of material misstatement is greater than the threshold (i.e., p > 50%), and
auditors should not test a phenomenon if the assessed likelihood of misstatement is less than the
threshold (i.e., p < 50%).17
We predict that a reward versus penalty frame increases testing (H1) by lowering the
subjective testing criterion (H2). Recall that a reward versus penalty frame increases
participants’ tendency to ensure hits and avoid misses in memory recognition (Crowe and
Higgins 1997; Levine et al. 2000; Bowen et al. 2020). Assuming this finding generalizes to
binary diagnostic tasks, we capture the increased focus on hits and misses in equation (5).
Compared to equation (3), equation (5) has an additional term 2 > 1, which represents the
increased focus on pursuing hits I# and avoiding misses I& . As a result, 2 lowers the right-hand
side value of equation (5) compared to equation (3), thereby lowering the testing criterion @$
needed to satisfy equation (5) under a reward versus penalty frame (H2). If an auditor was
indifferent to testing using a criterion when framing is absent, then adding the term (2 > 1)
decreases the criterion, so now the auditor tests as we predict in H1. Also note our predictions
are true regardless of auditors’ risk-preferences (e.g., degree of loss aversion).
N4(@$ | P5>) 1 (1 − N' ) (I% – I" )
=
N4(@$ | R<) 2 N'
(I# – I& )

17

A decision based on the equation can result in ex-post undesired outcomes (i.e., a miss or false alarm), just as a
decision that ignores the equation can result in ex-post desired outcomes (i.e., a hit or correct rejection). This is
consistent with the reality that even a well-planned audit can fail to reveal a misstatement.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Diagnostic Audit Task

Test
Do not test

Misstatement Absent

Misstatement Present

False Alarm

Hit

Correct rejection

Miss
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Table 2: Bags
Panel A: Composition of the 100 bags seen by each participant
The Risk of
Bag composition
Number of
Number of
Misstatement
(#Red - #White)
six balls bags
twelve ball bags
Lowest
-6
4
-4
6
3
-2
12
11
=
14
11
+2
12
8
+4
5
10
+6
1
2
Highest
+8
1
Total: 50
Total: 50
Panel B: Bag examples and the posterior likelihood of mislabeling
Fraction
Bag
Posterior
composition likelihood
Red
Six and twelve ball bag examples
-6

8.1%

-4

16.5%

25.0%
16.7%
33.3%
33.3%

-2

30.8%
41.7%
50.0%

=

50.0%
50.0%
66.7%

+2

69.2%
58.3%
83.3%

+4

83.5%
66.7%
100.0%

+6

91.9%
75.0%

+8

96.2%

83.3%

Participants saw the same set of 100 bags presented in random order. Bag composition is the difference
between red and white balls. Fraction red is the number of red balls divided by the bag size.
The posterior likelihood is the probability that a bag is mislabeled, which increases as the number of red
balls minus the number of white balls (#Red - #White) increases per bag, as illustrated below.
Specifically, the probability of a bag of N balls having X red balls, where X is 0 up to N, is given by the
probability mass function of the binomial distribution. The probability that a heating bag has X red balls
and N-X white balls is Pr(.|0123456) = . 4!"# . 6# <!
=, and the probability that a cooling bag has X red
#
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balls and N-X white balls is Pr(.|>??@456) = . 6!"# . 4# <!
=. Using Bayes Rule, given X red balls
#
observed, the posterior likelihood that the bag is a heating bag (mislabeled) is
A$ Pr(.|0123456)
A$ Pr(.|0123456) + (1 − A$ ) Pr(.|>??@456)
A% is the prior probability that the bag came from the heating distribution, which is 50%. The equation
above reduces to 1⁄(1 + (2/3)& ), where C is the number of red balls minus the number of white balls
observed. When the difference is zero (#Red - #White = 0), the posterior likelihood that the bag is a
heating bag (mislabeled) equals the prior probability (50%). With more (fewer) white balls than red, the
probability decreases (increases) from the prior.
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Table 3: Tests of Hypotheses
Descriptive statistics:
mean (standard deviation)
Treatment
Penalties
N = 90
Rewards
N = 86

% Tested
50.1%
(13.5%)
54.7%
(15.8%)

Testing Actions
Criterion
Location
-0.013
(0.408)
-0.160
(0.561)

Hit Rate
67.0%
(18.3%)
70.7%
(16.7%)

False
Alarm Rate
33.8%
(14.6%)
39.4%
(19.3%)

Testing
Accuracy
0.925
(0.528)
0.881
(0.496)

% Correct
66.6%
(9.4%)
65.6%
(8.8%)

No
prediction
-141
.162

No
prediction
-2.12
.032

H3: > 0
0.56
0.287†

H3: > 0
0.73
.233†

Risk Judgments
Judgment
Assessed Judgment
Inaccuracy Likelihood
bias
11.1%
(5.9%)
12.0%
(6.4%)

51.7%
(4.7%)
53.4%
(7.0%)

0.3%
(4.7%)
1.9%
(7.0%)

H3: < 0
-0.88
0.191†

RQ
-1.86
0.064

RQ
-1.86
0.064

Prediction: Penalties - Rewards
t (df = 174)
p-value

H1: < 0
-2.10
.019†

H2: > 0
1.99
.024†

†P-values are one-tailed, given directional predictions.
Dependent variables:
% Tested represents the percentage of bags tested averaged across 100 bags.
Criterion location = -0.5["($) + "(()] where H represents the hit rate and F represents the false alarm rate. A zero value indicates a neutral
testing criterion with no bias between testing and not testing. A negative value indicates a reduced testing threshold from the neutral criterion,
suggesting a bias towards testing. A positive value indicates an increased testing threshold from the neutral criterion, suggesting a bias towards
not testing. Hit rate is the percentage of mislabeled bags that are tested. False alarm rate is the percentage of correctly labeled bags that are
tested.
Testing accuracy = "($) – "((). A higher value indicates higher accuracy in testing across 100 bags.
% Correct is the percentage of testing decisions correctly made (i.e., hits and correct rejections) based on the actual bag type.
Judgment Inaccuracy = |assessed likelihood – posterior likelihood of mislabeling|, averaged across 100 bags. A higher value represents lower
accuracy. See posterior likelihood of mislabeling at Table 2.
Assessed likelihood is participants’ assessed likelihood of mislabeling averaged across 100 bags.
Judgment bias = assessed likelihood – posterior likelihood of mislabeling, averaged across 100 bags. See posterior likelihood of mislabeling at
Table 2.
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Independent variables:

We manipulate the incentive frame between participants. In the penalty frame condition, participants were informed that they would make $4 for
inspecting 100 bags. Additionally, they could pay a $2 penalty if more than 1/3 of their inspection decisions turned out to be incorrect. Participants
would not pay the penalty if 1/3 or fewer of their decisions turned out to be incorrect. In the reward frame condition, participants were informed
that they would make $2 for inspecting 100 bags. Additionally, they could earn a $2 bonus if 2/3 or more of their inspection decisions turned out
to be correct. Participants would not earn the bonus if fewer than 2/3 of their decisions turned out to be correct. Incorrect decisions refer to
decisions that result in misses or false alarms. Correct decisions refer to decisions that result in hits or correct rejections. See Table 1 for the four
diagnostic outcomes.
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Figure 1: Summary of Experimental Procedures
Recruitment
Screening for bots and informed consent
Task Instructions
Task description
Manipulation of the incentive frame between participants
Task comprehension checks
Feedback for task comprehension checks
Bag Inspection Task
Random presentation of 100 bags, one bag per screen
For each bag, participants decide to test it or not
For each bag, participants provide the likelihood of mislabeling
Post Experimental Questionnaire
Measures of the testing strategy
Measures of the task experience
(e.g., expected performance, effort, and motivation)
Additional measures (need for cognition, trait-level regulatory focus, loss aversion, and
cognitive reflection task)
Demographics
Task Feedback
Summarized actual performance on testing decisions and the associated pay
Comparison between participants’ assessed likelihood and the posterior likelihood for one bag
Calculation of the posterior likelihood of mislabeling based on bag composition
Payment
Payment based on the actual performance
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Figure 2: The Percentage of Bags Tested by Bag Composition (#Red - #White)

Percentage tested
sorted by #red balls

#white balls

100%
*
80%

60%

40%

*

20%
*
6

4

2

=
Penalties

+2

+4

+6

+8

Rewards

Note: * Different by incentive frame at a 5% level. See variable definitions at Table 2 and Table 3.
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Figure 3: Risk Judgment and Judgment Bias by Bag Composition (#Red - #White)

Accessed likelihood of mislabeling
sorted by #red balls

#white balls

100%

80%

60%

*
*

40%

20%

6

4

2

=

+2
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+4

+6

+8

+6
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Panel A: Assessed likelihood of mislabeling by composition

Judgment Bias
sorted by #red ball

#white balls

20%

10%

*
*

0

10%

120%
6

4

2

=
Penalties

+2

+4
Rewards

Panel B: Judgment bias by composition
Note: *Different by incentive frame at a 1% level. All judgment bias is significantly different from
zero at 1% level except for the #red = #white composition in the penalty frame condition. See variable
definitions at Table 2 and Table 3.
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Figure 4: Testing Action Conditioning on Risk Judgment and Risk Judgment by Bag Size

Percent tested
Sorted by assessed likelihood
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Panel A: Percent tested by assessed likelihood
Penalties, 6 Ball Bag

Penalties, 12 Ball Bag

Rewards, 6 Ball Bag

Rewards, 12 Ball Bag
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0%

100%
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0%
6

4

2
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+2

+4
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#red balls
Assessed
Likelihood

+8

6

4

2

=

+2

+4

+6
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#white balls

Fraction
Red

Posterior
Likelihood

Panel B: Assessed likelihood by incentive frame and bag size
Note: *Different by incentive frame at a 5% level. See variable definitions at Table 2 and Table 3.
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